Is Viktor Orbán trapped by historical schizophrenia? How Hungary faces the choice between the West and the East again / The nature of its ‘patronal autocracy’

East or West? Paganism or Christianity? Constantinople or Rome? Questions that have preoccupied the history of the Hungarian people ever since it was formed following the armed struggle for the throne left vacant by the death of the ruling prince Géza.

Prince Géza, baptised as a Christian, but with his heart in the values of ancient traditions and paganism, acknowledged that the fate of the Hungarians depended on the Roman Empire. To this end, he made alliances with the Germans, secured by the marriage of his son Stephen to Ghizela of Bavaria, sister of Emperor Henry II.

On the death of the ruling prince Géza, the pagan Koppányi claimed power according to ancient traditions that entitled him to inherit Géza’s titles, and according to pagan rules he had to marry the deceased’s widow Sarolta.

The ruling Prince Géza, however, left his first-born son Stefan as heir, applying the principle of primogeniture. With the help of Gisela’s father and other German rulers, Stephen defeated his uncle Koppány, whose remains he then displayed at the gates of the fortresses of Győr, Veszprém, Esztergom and Alba Iulia as a means of intimidating the rebellious pagans who refused to adopt Christianity and accept the new feudal system.

This victory was followed by the coronation of Stephen the First as King of Hungary by the Holy Roman Emperor Otto III and the process of Christianization of the Hungarians.

From this historical event arises the duality of the soul of the Hungarian nation: moderate vs. radical. Cooperation or confrontation? East or West? What would it have been like if Koppány had won?

This duality characterizes the entire history of the Hungarians, generating rivalries between the historical symbols of this nation, such as the rivalry between the moderate grof Széchényi Istváni and the radicals of Kossuth Lajos.

We embarked on a journey through the history of the Hungarian nation to understand the current regime of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, characterized more by the spirit of Koppány, endorsing radical positions, and confrontational politics both in foreign and domestic policies.

In his speech on December 4, 2023, at the Conference celebrating 50 years since the establishment of the Institute of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán referenced the principle of action in Hungary’s foreign policy, representing radical viewpoints. Orbán noted that Hungary starts at a disadvantage in promoting its interests abroad, considering its limited resources and economic potential.

Budapest capitalizes on the advantages arising from radical stances, which Viktor Orbán describes as Hungary’s soft power. Through this, Hungary expands its international scope of action, both tactically and strategically. The policy of opening to the East, the relationship with Russia, China, Turkey, and post-Soviet states, and the stance on the war in Ukraine – are radical positions upheld by Hungary, in stark opposition to the values and interests of NATO and the EU, and generally, what we call the West.

But how can Hungary’s foreign policy of opening towards the East, especially in relation to Russia, be explained? Firstly, the Hungarian prime minister has developed a relationship with autocratic, even dictatorial regimes in his policy of Eastern engagement, akin to or comparable with the regime Orbán has developed in Hungary.

This regime is well depicted by Bálint Magyar and Bálint Madlovics in their book, „The Anatomy of Post-Communist Regimes, A Conceptual Framework” (Central European University Press, 2020). The authors classify post-communist states into: liberal democracies, patronal democracies, patronal autocracies, dictatorships utilizing the free market, and classic dictatorships.

In this classification, Hungary is a patronal autocracy, alongside Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, a regime with a single pyramid, where the network of a single patron (political figure) subordinates other networks of interests and business. This regime is labeled as a post-communist mafia state, a clan state, a network patronized by the supreme leader of the dominant party, built on the model of an extended family.

The activity of this regime consists of exploiting public authority for personal gain. “Using public power, it divests the state of its assets for personal interests. Regarding the legitimacy and legality of this state, it is not captive, seized by oligarchs or interest groups, but a criminal state, as the entire state apparatus operates as a criminal organization.

Viktor Orbán borrows from Vladimir Putin’s toolkit, for example, by adopting the law for the protection of sovereignty, followed by the establishment of the Authority for the Protection of Sovereignty. The U.S. State Department expressed concern about this law, considered much harsher and more restrictive than Russia’s. The hypocrisy of the law also lies in the fact that Hungary has intervened and continues to intervene in the domestic politics of Balkan and neighboring countries, through funding political leaders, acquiring, and creating media organizations, etc.

Viktor Orbán, taking a page from Putin’s Russia, has also embraced the concept of „democratic sovereignty.” Russian strategist Vladislav Surkov, a former political advisor to President Vladimir Putin and architect of the Minsk Agreements, introduced the concept of „democratic sovereignty,” which allows the Russian president to enhance his chances of achieving geopolitical goals without adhering to Western rules.

This is another step in the process of Russia becoming a dictatorship under one person, the patriarch, who controls everything through a single party and a single network, much like a family.

Another reason for Hungary’s close relationship with Russia, China, Turkey, and its Eastern-focused foreign policy is the hope of benefiting from the geopolitical reshuffling due to the redrawing of power poles, challenging the unipolar power of the USA.

This line is part of Hungary’s hybrid revisionist policy, expressed through the strategy of reuniting the Hungarian nation in the Carpathian Basin. In this context, leaders in Budapest have implemented projects and measures in Transylvania over the last 13 years, such as granting dual citizenship and developing economic investment programs, affecting the sovereignty of states with Hungarian communities.

This could be seen as Orbán’s desire to recreate the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Several analysts and historians, like Stefano Bottoni and Péter Buda, a university professor and former intelligence officer, have expressed this view. Buda stated in a podcast that Orbán’s goal is to change borders and acquire new territories for Hungary. To this end, Orbán supports Russia, betting on Moscow establishing a new political order in Europe, allowing for the redrawing of borders.

Other historians, like Ungváry Krisztián, suggest that it’s unclear why Orbán is subordinate to Putin, subtly hinting at rumors that the Hungarian prime minister might be blackmailed by Moscow.

It’s certain that until his meeting with Vladimir Putin in Saint Petersburg in November 2009, Viktor Orbán had very harsh anti-Russia stances, including condemning Putin’s invasion of Georgia in 2008. “Eastern politics do not tolerate autonomy, independence, or freedom,” Orbán declared on October 23, 2007, at a FIDESZ gathering for Hungary’s National Day. “We should not allow our youth, who have escaped from the happiest barrack of the Soviet regime, to see Hungary transformed into the happiest barrack of Gazprom. Yes, these are important messages for the future,” he said on March 30, 2007, at FIDESZ’s 19th anniversary.

In this way, Viktor Orbán opposed the intentions of Prime Minister Gyurcsány Ferenc, which ultimately materialized in March 2009, accepting the “public offer of 1.4 billion EUR from Austrian OMV for a significant share package of the Hungarian company MOL. A few days later, OMV, partly Russian-owned, transferred its entire share package from MOL to the Russian company Surgutneftigaz, which supplies the Russian military and is closely linked to Putin.”

But what happened in Saint Petersburg in November 2009? How do we explain Orbán’s complete turnaround towards Russia? Some interpretations suggest that the change in attitude might be explained by Orbán’s alleged links with the secret services before the fall of the communist regime, leading to a relationship with the KGB. These interpretations have not been proven or considered relevant in today’s Hungary.

Other interpretations involve an incident in 1994, when Semion Mogilevich, the head of the Russian mafia who moved to Budapest in 1990, handed a briefcase containing one million German marks to Viktor Orbán through businessman Dietmar Clodo. Clodo later confirmed this in writing, but no other evidence has surfaced.

What is evident is a major discrepancy in Orbán’s position towards Russia before and after the November 2009 meeting with Putin. This major discrepancy has bred suspicions that Moscow has something on Viktor Orbán.

The Hungarian prime minister has not been an unconditional supporter of the West, as evidenced by his statements that have raised questions among the public and political commentators.

“There’s no tragedy if the 2003 accession is not realized. We are not EU members at this moment, and as we can see, there is life outside the EU. But this is not what we are preparing for. We ask for integration because it would give a new impulse to our economy,” Orbán stated on December 17, 1999, in an interview with the daily newspaper Világgazdaság (Global Economy).

Upon taking power in 2010, the day after winning the elections, in an international press conference, Viktor Orbán declared: “We will not be a colony!”, “Neither the IMF nor the EU is my boss!”. This marked the beginning of an unorthodox economic policy, leading to the creation of the National Cooperation System, the Hungarian version of family oligarchy, the business network of the patriarchal autocracy regime.

In his widely publicized speech on July 26, 2014, in Tușnad, Viktor Orbán stated: “We are trying to find that form of community organization, detached from the dogmas and ideologies of Western Europe, independent from them, that new Hungarian state, which can make our community competitive for decades in the great global competition.”

This speech introduced the concept of “illiberalism,” openly anti-Western.

Could Viktor Orbán’s radical, confrontational foreign policy be successful? The answer might begin with an anecdote: “A sailor on the Titanic runs to the captain, telling him he has good news and bad news. ‘Sir, the good news is that we won 7 Oscars! And the bad news?’ asks the captain. ‘We’re sinking!’ replies the sailor.”

Through his radical, confrontational foreign policy, Viktor Orbán achieves his internal goal, creating the image and feeling of a besieged city, a state that can only be defended by the supreme master. Internationally, Viktor Orbán has become very visible, gaining great notoriety, but this has not necessarily led to the affirmation of Hungary’s interests in international relations. On the contrary, Orbán’s Hungary has lost substantially, both morally and economically.

This image is not supported by economic or military power. Hungary’s GDP is so small that it represents only 1% of the EU’s GDP, effectively insignificant in power relations.

In an interview with the German newspaper Die Presse, German diplomat Martin Selmayr, former head of the EU executive, Secretary-General of the European Commission, stated that the EU has a solution to provide financial support for Ukraine, even after Hungary’s veto, and the Union cannot be blackmailed by Budapest.

However, the greatest vulnerability of Viktor Orbán’s regime is the demolition of the rule of law, undermining the healthcare and education systems. The paradox is that anti-immigrant Viktor Orbán resorts to foreign labor to compensate for the significant departure of Hungarians from the country, who, ironically, have not headed East but West.

There are increasing signals that the EU will change its operating rules to avoid situations like those generated by Viktor Orbán. A recent example is the European Council’s decision, in Hungary’s absence, to start accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. EU leaders found a way to isolate Orbán, simply asking him to leave the room to make a decision. It was a humiliating moment for the Hungarian leader and for Hungary as a state.

In fact, the only strong card Viktor Orbán plays is his veto right in EU decision-making, and the fact that he is a NATO member state. However, decisions are already being made without notifying Budapest, precisely because of suspicions that information quickly reaches Moscow.

This strategy of the Hungarian prime minister blocks the integration process of other states, such as those in the Western Balkans. Thus, Brussels needs guarantees and mechanisms to prevent and manage patronal autocracy regimes.

Viktor Orbán asserts that he does not want to leave the EU but to conquer it, to change it. He is betting on the results of the far right in European parliamentary elections and also in internal elections in member states. However, it can be observed that far-right leaders, once in power, have moderated their radicalism, becoming more moderate and strategically beginning to follow and support the Euro-Atlantic path (see Giorgia Meloni in Italy, or Robert Fico in Slovakia). Moreover, changes in Poland or the situation in Serbia could be a signal for the Hungarian prime minister.

The major stake for Viktor Orbán is the return of Donald Trump to the presidency of the USA in 2024. Surely such a result in 2024 will have effects on international relations, although not necessarily the effects the Hungarian prime minister anticipates.

Western democracies are not perfect, but they are regimes with minimum standards of guarantee in the field of human rights and freedoms, capable of correcting their vices, and where deviations from the principles of the rule of law have consequences.

In fact, what Viktor Orbán does not understand is that friendship with Russia is considered in Europe “the radical approach.” By supporting radical positions, which cannot be expressed by Russia, China, or Turkey, Viktor Orbán undermines the very sovereignty of Hungary, which is influenced by these powers, substantially limiting his margin of action in international relations, until he risks losing it.

Viktor Orbán is only repeating history. His maneuvers between the West and the East remind us of the duplicitous politics of Horthy Miklós during World War II. Hungarian-born political strategist George Friedman pointed out in his February 2014 analysis that: “Horthy’s strategy was to give the Germans what they needed and as much as they needed, to preserve Hungary’s sovereignty. Over time, as the Germans became more desperate with the Soviet approach, he had to give more and more. He didn’t give up his space of action; it was taken from him.”

Prince Géza, the ruling leader, was the child of a nation caught in the currents of the struggle between East and West, between Christianity and paganism, and between ancient traditions and modern European thought. He realized that the fate of the Hungarians was tied to the Roman-German Empire, acknowledging the power and grandeur of Western culture, the organization of the European state, and Christian teachings. Yet, he himself was deeply rooted in the old Hungarian world with its sentiments and could not fully detach from it.

What will Viktor Orbán do? Is he capable of change, or will he repeat history and follow the spirit of Koppány?

Koppány may have died, but his spirit is profoundly present in the soul of the Hungarian nation, in a perpetual struggle with the nation’s more moderate soul. There’s also a nostalgia in the Hungarian heart: had Koppány triumphed, the Hungarian nation might not have been victorious in defeat for a thousand years.

This spirit is authentically captured in the rock opera „King István.” Here are a few loosely translated verses from „The Spirit of Koppány Vezér”:

„Hungarians, men and women!

Listen to leader Koppány!

I don’t ask where your mother bore you,

Nor who your father was.

I only ask, awaiting the answer:

Shall we be slaves or free?

I don’t ask how long we shall endure our fate.

We could be conquerors again.

I only ask, awaiting the answer: Shall we be slaves or free?”

——

„There’s no turning back,

István is already preparing for battle,

Calling foreigners to aid against Hungarians,

Deeming me pagan, though I took the sign of Byzantium,

My aim was but to preserve our freedom,

Deeming me pagan because I don’t accept priestly power,

They scream at us when the people defend their freedom,

Deeming me pagan for confronting invaders,

All here are pagans if they’re with me and not with István.”

 

Traducerea: Ovidiu Harfas