ANALYSIS: The Hungarian community in Romania between Budapest and Bucharest—What Kelemen Hunor’s presidential candidacy reveals about power dynamics in the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania and its relationship with Viktor Orbán

Following the decision of the Council of Representatives of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) on September 6, Kelemen Hunor has become the individual with the most presidential candidacies in Romania’s history. UDMR is the main political organization representing the Hungarian minority in Romania. Kelemen is running for the fourth time for the nation’s highest office (2009 – 3.83%, 2014 – 3.47%, 2019 – 3.87%). With 28 years in high-level politics—including 13 years as UDMR president and roles as minister and deputy prime minister—he is one of the most experienced and capable leaders currently active.

Why Did UDMR Nominate a Candidate for the Presidential Elections?

What are the implications of this candidacy? At what juncture in Romanian-Hungarian relations does the UDMR leader’s candidacy occur? What are UDMR’s options and possibilities following this autumn’s elections?

Kelemen Hunor is only the third president of UDMR, after Domokos Géza and Markó Béla, reflecting the stable and consistent organizational culture of the most significant entity representing Romania’s Hungarian community. He is also only the third UDMR leader to run in presidential elections, following György Frunda (in 1996 – 6.02%, 2000 – 6.22%) and Markó Béla (in 2004 – 5.10%).

Kelemen Hunor was the favored successor of former president Markó Béla, who promoted him despite doubts and challenges from within the Union’s leadership. Figures like László Borbély and György Frunda had eagerly sought the UDMR presidency. Markó Béla believed that Kelemen Hunor had a deep understanding of Romanian political dynamics and was competitive in dialogue and negotiations. Kelemen climbed the internal ranks of UDMR, starting in 1997 as a state secretary in Bucharest, and later serving as deputy, executive vice president, and executive president.

Why Choose Kelemen Hunor as the Candidate?

Within UDMR, other potential candidates were considered for the presidential elections, especially since Kelemen Hunor had often expressed that another Union leader should run, as he had previously been a candidate and did not desire another campaign. Names mentioned included Árpád Antal—the mayor of Sfântu Gheorghe; Barna Tánczos, a UDMR senator and former Minister of Environment; and Attila Cseke, a UDMR senator and former minister of Regional Development and Public Administration. These names highlight the power groups within UDMR, and the candidacy of any of these leaders would have been more significant, potentially indicating Kelemen’s successor.

However, Kelemen was chosen because it was neither opportune nor desirable to open speculation about the incumbent president’s successor, who currently has total dominance within the Union. The UDMR leadership prefers to avoid such provocations, aiming to plan the transition in a controlled manner, allowing the current president significant influence over the choice of successor.

Kelemen Hunor has a strong résumé, with timely education from reputable institutions and a solid cultural background, recognized by public opinion, journalists, and the political class. Among the presidential candidates, he stands out as someone without issues related to competitiveness or integrity. Notably, UDMR is known for its effective personnel policies in selecting and nominating individuals for public office. In 34 years, UDMR representatives have maintained a reputable presence at the state level.

Launching the Campaign: „Today, We Need the Revolution of Common Sense!”

Building on this positive image, UDMR is launching its campaign for the presidential and parliamentary elections with the slogan: „Today, We Need the Revolution of Common Sense!”

This message was unveiled at the Council of Representatives meeting where the Union’s presidential candidate was accepted and launched. Reviewing the elements of the „failed state”—from education, health, culture, administration, and beyond—Kelemen Hunor highlighted that citizens perceive a nightmarish reality, „one in which the state treats the citizen as a servant, where the state has rights and the citizen has duties.” This situation leads to a lack of trust in the state by its citizens, which Kelemen identifies as the source of the crisis. The relationship between the state and the citizen is profoundly affected; therefore, he proposes changing this relationship as a solution. The purpose of his presidential candidacy and the parliamentary election campaign is to demonstrate that Romania can be governed differently—with common sense, rationality, and respect for its citizens.

The key themes of UDMR’s messages in both campaigns will be a state governed differently, based on competence and common sense.

UDMR’s Goal: To Enter Government After the Elections

But what factors will determine whether UDMR joins the government?

A primary factor will be the result of the presidential elections—the identity of the new head of state. This is both the most important and the most unpredictable factor at this time. However, one aspect is foreseeable:

„UDMR Will Have a Preferred Candidate in the Second Round of the Presidential Elections.”

Historically, UDMR has always supported a candidate in the second round of Romania’s presidential elections (except when Klaus Iohannis and Viorica Dăncilă were the finalists) and will do so again this autumn. This support might be explicit or tacit to avoid provoking nationalist Romanian voters. Based on current data, UDMR will back a candidate who, if victorious, would ensure the Union’s participation in the future government and facilitate constructive dialogue.

Another factor will be the outcome of the parliamentary elections, which will shape potential future governing alliances. At this moment, the most probable governing alliance is between the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL), with a less likely alliance around PNL and the Save Romania Union (USR).

UDMR has coalition potential, whether in a cohabitation between PSD and PNL or in a government formed by right-wing parties. UDMR will hold a position of power if it becomes indispensable—in other words, if it can tip the balance in creating a parliamentary majority.

If PSD and PNL secure a parliamentary majority on their own, UDMR’s presence in government might be uncertain. PNL could object to including UDMR, whose participation might strengthen PSD’s position and act as a safety net for the Social Democrats should PNL choose to leave the government. UDMR’s presence in such a coalition could limit PNL’s political maneuvering space.

UDMR’s Synergy with PSD

UDMR has a strong working relationship with PSD for several reasons. Firstly, PSD has maintained a respectful relationship with UDMR, honoring agreements and fostering constructive collaboration at both national and local levels, including during the European Parliament elections and local elections earlier this year.

This partnership continues tacitly for the upcoming elections. Evidence of this is Kelemen Hunor’s political stance, which includes sharp criticisms of PNL, President Klaus Iohannis, and the liberal presidential candidate, Nicolae Ciucă. PNL has often attempted to isolate UDMR: excluding them from the governing coalition, failing to honor local agreements, allying with the nationalist Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) against UDMR at the local level, and President Iohannis’s consistently hostile attitude toward UDMR.

UDMR is interested in participating in an executive branch that holds not just governance but actual power. The perception within UDMR is that real power does not lie with the executive but is exercised de facto by the secret services. Therefore, within UDMR, there is anticipation regarding the influence of these services on the upcoming autumn elections.

The Relationship with Viktor Orbán’s Hungary

UDMR’s relationship with the Hungarian government, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, could impact its potential to enter the Romanian government after the elections.

Since its establishment, UDMR has adopted a strategy of equidistance toward both Budapest and Bucharest, promoting the right of Hungarians in Transylvania to organize and determine their own goals and political representation, embracing a form of Transylvanian identity distinct from both nations.

This strategy has been one of the most important sources of UDMR’s legitimacy in Romanian politics, contributing to its inclusion in governments since 1989.

Shifts Under Kelemen Hunor’s Leadership

After Kelemen Hunor assumed leadership, UDMR’s strategy of equidistance began to shift. Gradually and methodically, UDMR came under the influence of Fidesz, Hungary’s ruling party led by Viktor Orbán. The reasons are multifaceted; there was a need to adjust the relationship between UDMR and Fidesz after Markó Béla’s departure to prevent losing voters. The critical question is how influential Fidesz has become within UDMR.

It’s important to note that direct instructions from Budapest to Kelemen Hunor on UDMR’s internal and external policies are unlikely. Influence is exerted more subtly.

A significant moment highlighting the UDMR–Fidesz relationship occurred when Kelemen Hunor, at Romanian President Klaus Iohannis’s request, refused to distance himself from Viktor Orbán’s controversial speech at Tușnad in 2022, which contained remarks criticized as racist. Kelemen Hunor publicly stated that this refusal was among the main reasons for UDMR’s exclusion from the Romanian government.

The expectation was for Kelemen Hunor to correct UDMR’s relationship with Fidesz, distancing the Union from the autocratic ideology and geopolitics of Viktor Orbán’s government. However, such a correction did not occur, nor was it feasible. Kelemen Hunor understands that without Fidesz’s support, UDMR might struggle to reach the electoral threshold. He is caught in a bind: on one hand, UDMR’s electorate is ideologically influenced by Fidesz; on the other, the Union is pressured to align with Romania’s foreign and internal policies to remain politically acceptable.

Challenges and Considerations

How successful will Kelemen Hunor be in keeping UDMR politically acceptable within Romania? How will he respond to Fidesz’s public suggestion, made through László Tőkés, for UDMR to join the „Patriots” group in the European Parliament—a group of nationalist and right-wing parties? Would UDMR have joined this group if the conditions were met for its formation, requiring parties from at least seven EU member states?

Kelemen Hunor has managed to mediate the relationship between Viktor Orbán’s Hungarian government and Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu’s administration, even as the two countries navigate different foreign policy paths, especially in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine and Hungary’s dissenting stance within NATO and the European Union.

It’s noteworthy that relations between Romania and Hungary have historically improved when UDMR was part of the Romanian government, serving as a bridge between the two nations.

To manage these complex realities, Kelemen Hunor has adopted a dual approach: aligning with Fidesz’s ideology for the Hungarian community in Romania while adhering to Romania’s foreign policy for broader society.

Pragmatism in Action

In bilateral relations between Bucharest and Budapest, Kelemen has built his role as a mediator on issues of mutual interest: economy, energy, infrastructure, and agriculture. Over the past two years, Hungary has toned down rhetoric that might irritate Bucharest, aiming to maintain dialogue with the Romanian government. Conversely, Romania also has vested interests in maintaining a constructive relationship with Hungary.

In domestic politics, UDMR is highly pragmatic, contributing balance and professionalism when in government and offering constructive criticism when in opposition—a fact acknowledged by other parliamentary parties.

The Underlying Risk

The core issue lies in the potential spread of Viktor Orbán’s ideology and the strategies of autocratic regimes. If such regimes cannot directly change the behavior of decision-makers, they aim to alter the environment in which decisions are made, indirectly influencing policymakers—a tactic reminiscent of hybrid warfare strategies.

Hungary under Viktor Orbán has employed and continues to employ this approach in its relations with other states and within the European Union, as well as in its interactions with UDMR.

Conclusion

Kelemen Hunor’s presidential candidacy aims to maximize UDMR’s performance in the parliamentary elections and to influence the presidential election campaign and outcomes in both the first and second rounds. UDMR has a preferred candidate for the presidency who, if successful, would likely facilitate the Union’s return to government and ensure a constructive dialogue.

UDMR’s goal is to join the government following the elections. This would enable it to have a say in managing European Union funds allocated to Romania—such as the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR)—and to participate in major decisions in the next parliamentary cycle, including potential administrative and territorial reorganization. Being part of the government also solidifies UDMR’s role as a bridge in Romanian-Hungarian bilateral relations, though this does not automatically resolve the complexities of its relationship with Fidesz.

The pressure UDMR faces, caught between the differing policies of Bucharest and Budapest, presents a vulnerability for the Union. Kelemen Hunor’s challenge is to prevent the isolation of UDMR and the Hungarian minority in Romania, avoiding a trajectory similar to the increasing isolation of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary within the European context—a development that is not in Romania’s interest, especially amid the broader geopolitical tensions arising from the war in Ukraine.