Civilians and the brass in the electoral campaign: who is pulling the strings?

In recent months, a series of events and stances have raised concerns that unseen actors may be influencing critical political and institutional decisions in the pivotal electoral year of 2024. Abruptly closed investigations targeting law enforcement agencies, sensitive cases opened during the electoral campaign, prosecutors sanctioned or promoted without clear rationale, and chief prosecutors who have institutionally collaborated with intelligence services. Above all, there’s the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), currently without civilian leadership, which President Klaus Iohannis claims is „functioning flawlessly.”

The conversation about the secret service’s influence in politics is fraught with the risk of veering into conspiracy theory territory, largely because tangible evidence is hard to come by. However, G4Media has a long history of scrutinizing these institutions’ actions and how state and society exercise civilian control over them. This debate is crucial not only because we’re at a critical juncture with four elections on the horizon but also due to signs that this civilian oversight is not as effective as it should be.

Arbitrary behaviors by heads of institutions are eroding public trust in the state. Trust is crucial for bodies like the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) or the General Prosecutor’s Office, especially when cases managed during the electoral campaign could alter the elections’ outcome: the opening of a case related to procurements in Sector 3 involving an associate of Prime Minister Ciolacu, the vaccines case targeting Vlad Voiculescu, and the halted investigation into the doctoral thesis of former Prime Minister Ciucă.

Questions arose with the appointment of the two chief prosecutors in March 2023, both from DIICOT, where collaboration with SRI on organized crime and counter-terrorism cases is mandatory. Plus, Marius Voineag’s close relationship with Bogdan Licu, considered the judiciary’s SRI „arrow,” has been a concern.

Marius Voineag’s tenure as head of DNA has confirmed initial fears. Among his first actions was to dismiss a case involving SRI procurements and the removal of a prosecutor who had dared to conduct searches and witness hearings. Voineag attempted to downplay the case and the prosecutor in a G4Media interview, using unusually casual language for a head of institution: „If we want to validate heroic theses that someone targets an SRI non-commissioned officer, it means it’s okay, we validate these heroic theses.”

Prosecutor Liviu Lascu’s response was swift. The dismissed prosecutor explained that he had not investigated a non-commissioned officer but SRI officers, and the investigation was advancing towards „the unit’s leadership.” Moreover, Lascu stated there was no reason to close the case, given that half of the products paid for and supposedly received by SRI had not been delivered. Liviu Lascu also legally rebutted Voineag’s defense, that the products were eventually received: „It is surprising for someone in Mr. Voineag’s position not to know that there is a moment when offenses are committed, both in the case of forgeries and abuse of office, which in this particular case occurred when the false documents were drawn up, respectively when the decision to make the payment for undelivered goods was made. A subsequent completion (with delay, to use his term) can only be considered as a mitigating circumstance but by no means as a cause for the exoneration of criminal liability.”

Not only the dismissal of the SRI procurement case raises questions. Equally concerning is Voineag’s swift firing of prosecutor Liviu Lascu without any reason communicated to the Superior Council of Magistracy (CSM). Lascu reported being followed through downtown Bucharest during those days, highlighting his courage in breaking the typical silence of this hierarchical system. It’s worth noting that surveillance of judiciary figures seems to have been a modus operandi since 2019, but investigations into such cases have always been buried.

Under Voineag, another criminal case leading to the military world was buried: the purchase of BMWs by the Romanian Police during Minister Lucian Bode’s tenure from a company owned by a friend of Klaus Iohannis. DNA swiftly closed the case, even though a state institution stated that the Police had favored a particular brand in the specifications. Voineag approved closing the case, claiming there were „no criminal acts.”

In both cases, the perception is that the DNA, under Marius Voineag, acted to assist the SRI and Police, not to uncover the truth and sanction deviations.

The relationship with SRI of the two chief prosecutors is highlighted in their statements in interviews with G4Media and TVR. Voineag openly stated that „we want to use” information obtained by SRI under national security warrants, while Alex Florența mentioned that „we have seen substantial, important informative aspects, which have already started to be delivered to DIICOT, and I am convinced that we will soon see significant actions based on these briefings and the criminal investigations carried out.”

Parallel to the elimination of prosecutors like Lascu or Bodean (DNA Constanța), Voineag and Florența raised no objections to the controversial promotions of prosecutors like Mihaiela Moraru Iorga and Remus Popa by the Ministry of Justice and President Iohannis, despite negative CSM opinions. This raises questions about the real independence of the two in the judiciary system.

All heads of major prosecutorial offices have had to manage their relationship with the security system. Daniel Morar tried to keep them at bay, Laura Codruța Kovesi had a close collaboration with SRI until she opened Pandora’s box by starting to investigate the operational funds of the police. In the case of prosecutors Voineag and Florența, the perception is that their relationship with the main intelligence service is extremely close, affecting their professional agenda. This is particularly emphasized in the case of Alex Florența. The judiciary system is abuzz about the case of a criminal from Timiș, in which he exhibited behavior that could be considered a vulnerability for the current Attorney General.

Another significant piece in the power puzzle at the state’s apex is the absence of a civilian SRI director following Eduard Hellvig’s departure in July 2023. There are several valid reasons for President Iohannis to prefer the interim leadership of General Răzvan Ionescu, the SRI’s first deputy. Among them, the short period until a new president comes to appoint a trusted person to the position, or instability at the institution’s top caused by too frequent changes. On the other hand, the interest of society is for the institution – essential in the internal security system – to have effective civilian control. Thus, the disappearance of the civilian director means precisely the disappearance of a control filter.

„SRI is led by the first deputy, General Ionescu, and I believe he is managing SRI very well (…) My assessment is that SRI is functioning flawlessly. So, from this point of view, nobody needs to worry,” said the president on February 1. It’s unclear how the president made this assessment and in what sense SRI is functioning flawlessly, as civil society can no longer ask anyone about this issue.

All these events occur against a backdrop of real tension: the pandemic and the war in Ukraine have led to an increase in the power of military structures. The vaccination campaign, which the militarized systems had preferential and secretive access to, and the secrecy around the aid given to Ukraine have fueled the perception that those wearing epaulettes play an oversized role in the Romanian state.

Let’s be clear: military institutions – services, army, police – play an essential role in the Romanian state, especially in the regional security context. They need tools like national security warrants (NSW), just as it’s normal for prosecutorial offices to be able to use relevant information gathered by services through NSWs. However, for a nascent democracy like Romania’s, two things are clear: effective civilian control over military structures and the guarantee that information gathered by them is not used in political games. Otherwise, we’re not talking about a democracy but a militocracy.