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Moldova: Atac cibernetic la Curtea de Conturi. Toate bazele de date publice…

Moldova: Atac cibernetic la Curtea de Conturi. Toate bazele de date publice de pe site au fost distruse

Analize, Republica Moldova • 15 Iulie 2021 • • 9 comentarii

Curtea de Conturi din Republica Moldova (CCRM) anunță că pagina web a instituției a fost joi ținta unui atac cibernetic și că toate bazele de date publice de pe site au fost distruse. Într-un comunicat transmis de CCRM, preluat de Ziarul de Gardă din Republica Moldova, se precizează că instituția va investiga cine a stat în spatele atacului „și dacă acesta a fost organizat în scopuri de șantajare”. „Este pentru prima oară când instituția supremă de audit se confruntă cu o asemenea situație. Distrugerea paginii publice a avut loc în contextul unor audituri de rezonanță și cu impact în societate, la etapa raportării și mediatizării celor mai importante misiuni de audit planificate în activitatea instituției. Investigațiile de rigoare vor identifica dacă atacul a fost organizat de hackeri arbitrar, în scopuri de șantajare, sau este vorba de o comandă planificată pentru a crea impedimente în activitatea instituției supreme de audit din țară. Curtea de Conturi lucrează la restabilirea paginii electronice oficiale și acest proces va dura o perioadă de timp, fiind depuse toate eforturile necesare pentru ca pagina să fie funcțională cât de curând posibil”, se menționează în comunicatul transmis de CCRM.

Potrivit publicației moldovene, poliția a comunicat că nu a fost sesizată pe marginea acestui caz.

Curtea de Conturi e condusă de un fost președinte al țării

Actualul președinte al Curții de Conturi din Republica Moldova este Marian Ilici Lupu. A fost deputat în Parlamentul Republicii Moldova între 2005 și 2019 și președinte al Parlamentului între 2005 și 2009. Lupu a fost inclusiv președinte interimar al republicii între 2010 și 2012.

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  1. Big reset

  2. Gru-ul moare de ciudă că a pierdut alegerile în Basarabia
    Mare brânză, că au dat jos un site…

  3. hohooo se simte duhoarea de hackeri rusesti de la o posta …

  4. E doar începutul. Republica Moldova e un laborator al federației ruse în ceea ce privește războiul hibrid. Pe de altă parte jefuitorii trebuie să acopere urmele.

  5. Mafia incepe sa-si stearga urmele. Sa-i spuna lui mutu’ ca s-au pierdut bazele de date. In orice sistem informatic serios se fac replicari si copii de siguranta ale bazei de date. Aici in mod sigur e ceva deliberat pus la cale de cei care au de ascuns ceva.

  7. S-au curatat toate bazele de date. Toata lumea este curata si spalata ca un nou nascut! Restul e can-can!!!

    E ca si cum ar intervenii prescrierea!!!

  8. Pt. necunoscatori: Daca hardware-ul n-a fost distrus, datele n-au fost distruse. Exista algoritmi de recuperare, dureaza, ce-i drept. Despre ce ‘size-uri’ vorbim ? Stie careva ?

    D’asta e bine ca astfel de date sa fie tinute pe cloud-uri cu ‘zero trust paradigm’, cam ce urmeaza Microsoft sa lanseze … Doar ca in cazul lor, ‘zero trust’ nu inseamna si ‘zero knowledge’ …

  9. 2. Methods of Recovery for Data stored on Magnetic Media
    Magnetic force microscopy (MFM) is a recent technique for imaging magnetization patterns with high resolution and minimal sample preparation. The technique is derived from scanning probe microscopy (SPM) and uses a sharp magnetic tip attached to a flexible cantilever placed close to the surface to be analysed, where it interacts with the stray field emanating from the sample. An image of the field at the surface is formed by moving the tip across the surface and measuring the force (or force gradient) as a function of position. The strength of the interaction is measured by monitoring the position of the cantilever using an optical interferometer or tunnelling sensor.
    Magnetic force scanning tunneling microscopy (STM) is a more recent variant of this technique which uses a probe tip typically made by plating pure nickel onto a prepatterned surface, peeling the resulting thin film from the substrate it was plated onto and plating it with a thin layer of gold to minimise corrosion, and mounting it in a probe where it is placed at some small bias potential (typically a few tenths of a nanoamp at a few volts DC) so that electrons from the surface under test can tunnel across the gap to the probe tip (or vice versa). The probe is scanned across the surface to be analysed as a feedback system continuously adjusts the vertical position to maintain a constant current. The image is then generated in the same way as for MFM [4] [5]. Other techniques which have been used in the past to analyse magnetic media are the use of ferrofluid in combination with optical microscopes (which, with gigabit/square inch recording density is no longer feasible as the magnetic features are smaller than the wavelength of visible light) and a number of exotic techniques which require significant sample preparation and expensive equipment. In comparison, MFM can be performed through the protective overcoat applied to magnetic media, requires little or no sample preparation, and can produce results in a very short time.

    Even for a relatively inexperienced user the time to start getting images of the data on a drive platter is about 5 minutes. To start getting useful images of a particular track requires more than a passing knowledge of disk formats, but these are well-documented, and once the correct location on the platter is found a single image would take approximately 2-10 minutes depending on the skill of the operator and the resolution required. With one of the more expensive MFM’s it is possible to automate a collection sequence and theoretically possible to collect an image of the entire disk by changing the MFM controller software.

    There are, from manufacturers sales figures, several thousand SPM’s in use in the field today, some of which have special features for analysing disk drive platters, such as the vacuum chucks for standard disk drive platters along with specialised modes of operation for magnetic media analysis. These SPM’s can be used with sophisticated programmable controllers and analysis software to allow automation of the data recovery process. If commercially-available SPM’s are considered too expensive, it is possible to build a reasonably capable SPM for about US$1400, using a PC as a controller [6].

    Faced with techniques such as MFM, truly deleting data from magnetic media is very difficult. The problem lies in the fact that when data is written to the medium, the write head sets the polarity of most, but not all, of the magnetic domains. This is partially due to the inability of the writing device to write in exactly the same location each time, and partially due to the variations in media sensitivity and field strength over time and among devices.

    In conventional terms, when a one is written to disk the media records a one, and when a zero is written the media records a zero. However the actual effect is closer to obtaining a 0.95 when a zero is overwritten with a one, and a 1.05 when a one is overwritten with a one. Normal disk circuitry is set up so that both these values are read as ones, but using specialised circuitry it is possible to work out what previous „layers” contained. The recovery of at least one or two layers of overwritten data isn’t too hard to perform by reading the signal from the analog head electronics with a high-quality digital sampling oscilloscope, downloading the sampled waveform to a PC, and analysing it in software to recover the previously recorded signal. What the software does is generate an „ideal” read signal and subtract it from what was actually read, leaving as the difference the remnant of the previous signal. Since the analog circuitry in a commercial hard drive is nowhere near the quality of the circuitry in the oscilloscope used to sample the signal, the ability exists to recover a lot of extra information which isn’t exploited by the hard drive electronics (although with newer channel coding techniques such as PRML (explained further on) which require extensive amounts of signal processing, the use of simple tools such as an oscilloscope to directly recover the data is no longer possible).

    Using MFM, we can go even further than this. During normal readback, a conventional head averages the signal over the track, and any remnant magnetization at the track edges simply contributes a small percentage of noise to the total signal. The sampling region is too broad to distinctly detect the remnant magnetization at the track edges, so that the overwritten data which is still present beside the new data cannot be recovered without the use of specialised techniques such as MFM or STM (in fact one of the „official” uses of MFM or STM is to evaluate the effectiveness of disk drive servo-positioning mechanisms) [7]. Most drives are capable of microstepping the heads for internal diagnostic and error recovery purposes (typical error recovery strategies consist of rereading tracks with slightly changed data threshold and window offsets and varying the head positioning by a few percent to either side of the track), but writing to the media while the head is off-track in order to erase the remnant signal carries too much risk of making neighbouring tracks unreadable to be useful (for this reason the microstepping capability is made very difficult to access by external means).

    These specialised techniques also allow data to be recovered from magnetic media long after the read/write head of the drive is incapable of reading anything useful. For example one experiment in AC erasure involved driving the write head with a 40 MHz square wave with an initial current of 12 mA which was dropped in 2 mA steps to a final level of 2 mA in successive passes, an order of magnitude more than the usual write current which ranges from high microamps to low milliamps. Any remnant bit patterns left by this erasing process were far too faint to be detected by the read head, but could still be observed using MFM [8].

    Even with a DC erasure process, traces of the previously recorded signal may persist until the applied DC field is several times the media coercivity [9].

    Deviations in the position of the drive head from the original track may leave significant portions of the previous data along the track edge relatively untouched. Newly written data, present as wide alternating light and dark bands in MFM and STM images, are often superimposed over previously recorded data which persists at the track edges. Regions where the old and new data coincide create continuous magnetization between the two. However, if the new transition is out of phase with the previous one, a few microns of erase band with no definite magnetization are created at the juncture of the old and new tracks. The write field in the erase band is above the coercivity of the media and would change the magnetization in these areas, but its magnitude is not high enough to create new well- defined transitions. One experiment involved writing a fixed pattern of all 1’s with a bit interval of 2.5 µm, moving the write head off-track by approximately half a track width, and then writing the pattern again with a frequency slightly higher than that of the previously recorded track for a bit interval of 2.45 µm to create all possible phase differences between the transitions in the old and new tracks. Using a 4.2 µm wide head produced an erase band of approximately 1 µm in width when the old and new tracks were 180° out of phase, dropping to almost nothing when the two tracks were in-phase. Writing data at a higher frequency with the original tracks bit interval at 0.5 µm and the new tracks bit interval at 0.49 µm allows a single MFM image to contain all possible phase differences, showing a dramatic increase in the width of the erase band as the two tracks move from in-phase to 180° out of phase [10].

    In addition, the new track width can exhibit modulation which depends on the phase relationship between the old and new patterns, allowing the previous data to be recovered even if the old data patterns themselves are no longer distinct. The overwrite performance also depends on the position of the write head relative to the originally written track. If the head is directly aligned with the track, overwrite performance is relatively good; as the head moves offtrack, the performance drops markedly as the remnant components of the original data are read back along with the newly-written signal. This effect is less noticeable as the write frequency increases due to the greater attenuation of the field with distance [11].

    When all the above factors are combined it turns out that each track contains an image of everything ever written to it, but that the contribution from each „layer” gets progressively smaller the further back it was made. Intelligence organisations have a lot of expertise in recovering these palimpsestuous images.