Putin benefits from Navalny’s death, knowing that detention was an unpredictable matter / The disappearance of the opposition figure is the best counter-argument for those insisting on negotiations with Russia” – Romanian historian Cosmin Popa

Aleksei Navalny’s death, the leading opponent of the Kremlin’s dictatorial regime, serves as the strongest counterargument against those insisting on negotiations with Russia, and his elimination, announced on Friday, benefits Vladimir Putin, explains historian Cosmin Popa, a specialist in Soviet issues and Russia.

Putin is indifferent to how he is perceived internationally because his regime has already lost credibility. For the Kremlin dictator, the political detention of Navalny was an unpredictable matter, the historian further explains in an interview with G4Media.

Popa indicates that in the context of the war and the upcoming presidential elections, it is crucial for Putin to eliminate even the theoretical possibility of losing power. „Today you can be in prison, tomorrow in power,” states Cosmin Popa.

The historian also mentions that regardless of what the official reports might suggest, the Russian state is solely responsible for Navalny’s death, as he was under its care. According to Popa, operating on intimidation and force, Putin governs in exactly this manner. Ultimately, the disappearance of the Kremlin’s main opponent is a show of strength to the entire Russian society:

„However, this does not theoretically eliminate the possibility of the famous Russian uprising that will happen sooner or later,” adds historian Cosmin Popa.

Reporter: Does Navalny’s death benefit or disadvantage Putin, in the current context, ahead of the elections?

Cosmin Popa: It’s important to say that regardless of the causes of Navalny’s death, the Russian state bears full responsibility for it. Being in detention, he was under the state’s protection. Therefore, discussions about natural death or induced death are somewhat secondary, although there are many precedents of attempts by the authorities to intimidate and then poison him, as the investigation he initiated at the time would show. From this perspective, I believe things are very clear now regarding Putin.

We must judge from Putin’s subsequent plans because if the regime is preparing, say, a refresh of the political elite, a series of measures that will provoke strong societal opposition or unpopular actions, such as a total mobilization, or concentrating economic decisions exclusively in the hands of the state administration, etc. (which will surely have effects on the political elites), then it becomes essential for the opposition to be leaderless.

It has been very clear that, with Boris Nadejdin’s ban from participating in elections, there is a deadlock regarding who can gather all the popular dissatisfaction existing in Russia. This is what the Putin regime primarily fears. The regime has clearly seen a state of tension, a social demand for change, for relaxation, and seeks to remove any potential accumulator of this state, any potential opposition politician who can gather all these grievances and pass them on. On one hand.

On the other hand, the Putin regime knows precisely that political detention is an unpredictable matter, in the sense that there have been many cases where politicians who have been imprisoned have, in a very short time, reached the top of the state. Of course, things have unfolded more rapidly or over a longer term, as was the case with Nelson Mandela, but they have unfolded. For the Putin regime, it is very important that there is not even a theoretical possibility of the emergence of a strong opposition leader.

From this perspective, Navalny’s disappearance simply benefits the Putin regime. And we must never forget the criminal precedents of this regime: Anna Politkovskaya, Boris Nemtsov. There is nothing else there but political crimes, and I expect that, under these circumstances, the life of Vladimir Kara-Murza is just as much in danger.

Rep.: We know that Russian opponents die and each time in controversial if not transparent ways. But Navalny was the most well-known, perhaps we expected him to live precisely because he was a strong opposition leader, at least for appearances. In prison, obviously, but alive. What does his death tell us, then?

Cosmin Popa: We must understand that the Russian political system, as mainly shaped by Putin, operates largely on the basis of fear and intimidation, as it does on the basis of reward, mainly economic but also symbolic.

Being a political regime founded on intimidation and force, it governs in this way. For how the Putin regime sees the world, Navalny’s disappearance is, if you will, a message of strength sent to the entire society.

And we must agree on a fundamental thing, namely that the Putin regime is no longer interested in international credibility, in its international image. They no longer exist anyway because this regime knows exactly that its main negotiation arguments, the dialogue with the civilized world, are not its credibility or image, but the nuclear weapons it holds, the force it can use at any time, and the capacity to cause disturbances in various parts of the world. So, from this point of view, the international perception of the regime is, if you will, the last concern of the Putin regime.

What Putin recently tried with that pseudo-interview with the former American journalist was rather, if you will, a last-ditch attempt to influence American public opinion in the perspective of the elections, without counting on major effects in terms of perception.

Rep.: What effect does Aleksei Navalny’s death have on the Russian opposition? Does it inflame or, on the contrary, paralyze it since even its leader, Navalny, has died?

Cosmin Popa: The first reaction is, of course, dismay. And it’s absolutely normal for things to happen this way. At the moment, we must agree on one thing, namely that, unfortunately, the opposition in Russia is either electronic or one that acts from outside the country’s borders, which greatly limits the capacity for action.

The regime is fully aware of the popular grievances, it sees this from what is happening: the actions of women, the actions of individual protesters, acts of civil disobedience, the burning of the police station, it knows exactly. And it also knows very well that for the regime to survive, it needs two things:

An extensive, well-organized, and disciplined repression apparatus. And it equally needs the absence of a credible politician who embodies and deposits all the hopes and all the desire for change in society. As long as it has these two pillars to rely on, to which we add the nuclear arsenal and brute force, the Putin regime has nothing to fear. But this does not theoretically eliminate the possibility of the famous Russian uprising that will happen sooner or later.

Rep.: Does Navalny’s death accelerate the appearance of another leader, or will there be a long period without opposition in Russia?

Cosmin Popa: The regime’s expected effect is the fragmentation of the opposition in the absence of a leader who can garner the support of the majority of those who oppose the regime through deeds, thoughts, and words. And the first effect it aims for is precisely this disconcerting of the opposition. On one hand.

On the other hand, it is evident that when there is a social demand for opposition, logic, the nature of things will lead to the appearance of a leader who embodies it. Who he will be, whether it will be Vladimir Kara-Murza, who, unfortunately, is also in prison, or someone else, among those who are outside Russia today, remains to be seen.

However, it is clear that the regime has only to gain from Navalny’s disappearance. I expect that soon, starting with Zaharova from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and up to Putin, the West, especially the USA, will be blamed for Navalny’s death.

Navalny’s death, I believe, is the best counterargument for those who insist on the necessity of negotiations with Russia. To what extent can this regime be credible in the promises it makes? Unfortunately, the only argument that works in relation to this regime is force and the explicit display of willingness to go to the consequences of the ultimate confrontation.