The Romanian model 

Romania is neither Poland nor Hungary, but it is starting to be increasingly associated with these two EU problem countries. There are just differences in style. In our country, the authoritarian drift is soft, ‘under the table’ and not ideologically assumed. We don’t have a strong leader, a central figure like Viktor Orban, who stirs up a lot of controversy in society or rumblings in Brussels. 

On the contrary, the government in Bucharest and President Iohannis claim to be pro-Western in their statements. The head of state is dreaming of a high office after the end of his mandate. He recently hinted that he would accept the NATO chairmanship if offered it. 

For this reason, almost all official statements made by the president or the prime minister on important issues of foreign policy, justice, rule of law, and European values sound impeccable. Judging by appearances, Romania seems the most liberal and pro-European state in the region. 

In reality, Romania today is anything but a functioning democracy. Under President Iohannis and the PSD-PNL-UDMR coalition, the country is moving further and further away from European values. 

The major difference from Poland or Hungary is this duplicitous discourse: the leaders in Bucharest say what the officials in Brussels or Washington want to hear, but do whatever they want. Duplicity as a way of life, lack of faith in anything, and extreme flexibility of the backbone characterize most Romanian politicians of yesterday and today, as well as a significant part of society. 

The Romanian model has been functioning almost unchanged, in its essence, for at least half a century, with roots stretching back two or three centuries to the time of the Phanariot reigns.   

The model also worked with some success under Ceaușescu, when he opposed the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, managing to fool the West for a while. Even then, Romania looked different from the rest of the communist bloc. But it was the same in terms of how power was exercised. Only Ceausescu’s personal calculations made him seem different.   

The most recent attempt to deceive the West was reported by three associations of magistrates. They accused the justice minister, Cătălin Predoiu, of debating draft laws other than those presented to the European Commission. In other words, Predoiu presented a package of reforms to Brussels that were not reflected in the laws promoted in the country. 

The examples could go on and on. In the presence of the Vice-President of the European Commission, Věra Jourová, who was visiting Bucharest, Parliament transposed, in the purest Romanian style, a directive on the whistleblower, practically stripping the law of its content. All the while, the head of state was at the Cotroceni, arm in arm with the European official, making cliché statements about the justice reforms and the need to lift the CVM.   

Romania’s departure from the European rules can be seen even more clearly in the statistics. Romania ranks 21st out of 28 (no. at the time of the survey UK was part of the EU) among European countries in a ranking that measures the number of proceedings opened by the European Commission against countries that have not transposed European directives on time or have transposed and implemented them incorrectly. 

The strongest warning signals also come from abroad. The latest analysis published by the prestigious British think-tank Oxford Analytica, one of the most influential globally, gives an accurate x-ray of how Romania is performing under President Iohannis.   

Titled ‘The president is eroding pluralist democracy in Romania‘, the analysis shows that Iohannis is increasingly relying on the intelligence services to maintain his power.   

Oxford Analytica repeatedly points to the power of the intelligence services, showing that they have even been given the role of overseeing foreign investment.   

OXAN’s analysis devotes substantial space to draft national security bills, published exclusively by G4Media, showing that „the drafts were drawn up by intelligence officials (an act of questionable legality) with the knowledge of the offices of the president and the prime minister”. „The proposals would greatly increase the powers of the Romanian domestic intelligence service (SRI), leaving it accountable only to the president and his advisers.” 

In addition to independent analyses, there are official reports from Brussels or Washington.   

Romania’s press has been placed in the highest risk category for freedom of expression, according to a report on respect for the rule of law in the EU released by the European Commission in mid-July. It is another relevant indicator of accelerating democratic decay.   

Freedom of expression and freedom of the press in Romania also featured prominently in the US State Department’s 2021 Report on Human Rights in Romania, released in mid-April.   

In addition, the US partners draw attention to the phenomenon of corruption: „corrupt practices remain widespread, despite several high-profile prosecutions. There have been numerous reports of government corruption during this year, sometimes with impunity. Corruption and misuse of public funds were widespread.” 

So what does Romania look like today, 30 years after the fall of communism? Very changed on the surface, of course, with many rights and freedoms gained, a member of NATO and the EU; there is no comparison.   

But there is something eternal, unchanged, deeply imbued in the Romanian model of the functioning of power, based on the secret services, on the temptation of the single party and statism, on a press censored to the hilt, on counter-selection at the top of power, on the duplicity of leaders, on a population gorged with propaganda and lies and poorly educated, on corruption as a way of life, on the shirking of responsibility from top to bottom.   

Romania has not internalized Western values in the last 30 years. It mimics them with great skill, but it has remained the same country of forms without substance, a marginal state, a source of immigration for the West, a brain-drain. 

Even the administrative framework, the centralized model of distributing money from Bucharest to the counties, is the same as 50 years ago. Nothing has changed significantly on the map of Romania.   

For many of my generation, it is disarming to see how this bankrupt model has been perpetuated for decades after the fall of communism, how today’s stifling atmosphere increasingly resembles that of pre-’89 and how Romania is going back in time, with all its unquestionable economic progress, to habits and habits that we all hoped had been definitively overcome.   

Whoever is not part of the small party and state nomenclature does not exist. Life on one’s own seems an endless nightmare.   

The system still seems closed for the long term, for at least two electoral cycles, with little hope of being improved. For this reason, just as before 1989, those who see and understand what is happening around them choose personal salvation, with the notable difference that before you had to run away, now you can leave in peace, without the risk of being detained at the border. 

Traducere: Ovidiu Harfas