Why were the results of Moldova’s referendum on European integration so narrow?

After counting almost all the votes cast on Sunday in the constitutional referendum, the „Yes” vote is leading by about 11,000 votes, with 50.4% to 49.6% out of nearly 1.5 million votes. How can such a close result be explained?

Opinion polls – All polls had generally predicted comfortable victories for the „Yes” side, creating an unrealistic expectation for supporters of European integration. This also applies to older polls from before the referendum was called, which for many years showed general support for European integration when it wasn’t a realistic prospect. Several recent polls showed a large number of undecided voters, non-voters, and refusals to respond, which artificially inflated the „Yes” vote by elimination. It’s clear that most of these voters intended to vote „No” or decided at the last minute, influenced by factors that couldn’t be quantified in the polls.

The decision to hold the referendum – President Maia Sandu (the pro-European President of Moldova since 2020) called the referendum, asking the question: „Do you support amending the Constitution to allow Moldova to join the European Union?” However, the decision to hold a referendum on this issue, when the EU had only just decided to start accession negotiations with Moldova on June 25, 2024— the start of a long and uncertain process—caused confusion among some EU member states. Sandu’s opponents labeled the referendum unnecessary, accusing her of using this political gesture to boost her chances in the simultaneous presidential election, aiming to win in the first round with an absolute majority. This argument, credible to some, likely had a certain impact.

Sabotage by the Russian Federation – It’s clear that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Moldova’s neighboring position, as well as President Sandu’s firm alignment with the West, particularly the EU, in this conflict, led EU leaders to acknowledge that Moldova could no longer remain in the „grey zone,” essentially under Russia’s influence. However, Moscow has not accepted this new geopolitical reality, and launched an intense campaign around the referendum and presidential elections using various means. The main levers used were:

Financial influence – The key player here was Ilan Shor, a fugitive politician convicted in Moldova for stealing a billion dollars. From Moscow, he directed significant sums of money in euros to the anti-European opposition through intermediaries. Much of this money, smuggled via indirect air routes, was confiscated by authorities, leading to claims of victimization and the invocation of court orders. Other funds arrived via bank transfers to individuals in Moldova, and authorities reported attempts to bribe around 150,000 people. In September 2024 alone, about $15 million was transferred. President Maia Sandu denounced this interference in her first reaction after polls closed, claiming that attempts were made to bribe 300,000 voters, though she did not name Russia. The media documented voter bribery attempts on election day itself.

Disinformation – False narratives spread mainly through social media, with devastating effects. On platforms like Vkontakte, Smotri.ru, Telegram, or TikTok, falsehoods circulated, such as claims that the EU was demanding changes in identity documents, replacing “Father” and “Mother” with “Parent 1” and “Parent 2,” or that the EU was introducing quotas for LGBT representation in public offices. In a country where homophobia remains deeply ingrained, these lies proved highly effective in the referendum. Another method involved inserting false narratives into popular Russian-language pirated film sites in Moldova, where professionally made videos were inserted, sometimes claiming to be from Western organizations. One such video falsely presented a Russian paramilitary camp for children as a NATO camp.

The spread of the Russian language in society – About 20% of Moldova’s population speaks a language other than Romanian, mainly Russian, regardless of ethnicity. In the southern region of Gagauzia, 95% of voters opposed European integration, while in Taraclia, a majority Bulgarian district, 86% voted against. Similarly, the majority of northern Moldova, home to many ethnic Ukrainians, voted “No,” despite Russia’s war against Ukraine. Ethnic Russians in Moldova also largely oppose EU integration, though to a lesser extent, being more urbanized and better educated. Russian often serves as an interethnic communication tool, and this language becomes a tool for manipulation. The ethno-linguistic factor often outweighs economic benefits from the EU, with loyalty to Russia taking precedence, especially for Gagauzians and Bulgarians, whose loyalty has been shaped by 200 years of Tsarist colonization in southern Bessarabia.

Limited number of polling stations abroad – Although a marginal factor, it gained importance in such a tight vote. The Diaspora vote determined the victory of the “Yes” side, with the margin there exceeding the “No” margin within Moldova. Images of long lines at just three polling stations in Bucharest suggested this might be significant. However, it should be noted that in Russia, where many Moldovans live, only two polling stations were opened in Moscow. Chisinau’s authorities may have aimed for a balance in this delicate situation.

Attitudes of some Romanians in Romania – Another marginal factor stems from the ignorance of many west of the Prut River about Moldova’s situation. This often leads to a knee-jerk reaction, where Moldovan issues are automatically tied to topics like reunification, ethnicity, or language, reflecting nationalist-patriotic sentiments. This reveals a false sense of superiority, which leads some to call Moldovans “Russians” or “fools,” a reaction often stemming from people with an inferiority complex. Such attitudes were even seen in politicians like Nicolae Ciucă, leader of Romania’s National Liberal Party (PNL) and presidential candidate. On October 20, he declared, „Today’s referendum is the chance for the reunification of Romania and Moldova in the European Union.” Such statements, especially in an electoral context, are a gift to Russian propaganda, which has stoked anti-Romanian sentiment for over a century and frequently uses the fear of reunification with Romania in election contexts.